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 INTRODUCTION 
 
On January 2, 2011, Egyptian Wael Eskandar wrote in English on his blog Notes 
from the Underground, “People accuse me of treason when I say that I don't love 
Egypt anymore. The reality is that I'm just being honest…Egypt has been lost and 
we're not even aware of it.” He went on to explain, “I do not fool myself by 
giving love to this evil replica. Surely this is not my country; it's not a country that 
I want to be associated with. It's a country of thugs, thieves and murderers.”  
 In this post, Eskandar expressed frustration with the current state of Egypt, 
suggesting that the political regime had turned his country into something 
unrecognizable. During Hosni Mubarak’s presidency from 1981 to 2011, an 
autocratic state dominated political life in Egypt. Restrictive laws governed the 
creation of political parties, preventing new ones from forming, while existing 
parties served largely to provide just enough dissent to further entrench the regime 
(Albrecht 2013). The state maintained tight control over the media, and dissenting 
voices were regularly silenced through censorship.  
 But Eskandar’s lament for Egypt in early January was not merely a narrow 
critique of its political system. Rather, he seemed to invoke a more meaningful 
sense of loss of his country and of what it meant to be Egyptian. He wrote, “I love 
the old sinking Egypt that was full of kindness, full of beauty. I don't like this new 
one that's full of ignorance, poverty, injustice, hate, extremism and disrespect.” 
Here he presented a dichotomy of shared values and social conditions between the 
“old Egypt” and the “new one.” Though it is unclear when this perceived 
degradation took place, Eskandar had a firm sense that the people bore some 
responsibility for the changes. “This is a country that we shape, not a person that 
we have to accept,” he stated, clearly staking a claim in the process of building a 
better Egypt and assigning responsibility to the people for the construction of their 
own nation.  
On January 25, Eskandar joined the protests that would topple the 
government of Hosni Mubarak after eighteen days of uprising across the country. 
As the uprising built momentum in the ensuing days, Eskandar remarked that the 
change he hoped for was beginning to take shape, thanks to the protestors in 
Tahrir Square in Cairo: “I had thought the country would take numerous years to 
change into that which we hoped for. All it takes is a visit to Tahrir Square (which 
I now call Tahrir Republic) to see that it took only four days to change people.” In 
Tahrir Square, Eskandar experienced a version of Egyptian nationhood very 
different from that which he had experienced under the Mubarak regime.  In the 
wake of Mubarak’s fall, he reflected, “In Tahrir, I found out what [belonging to a 
nation] really means. It means your brothers and sisters and your whole extended 
family living in the same place, sharing the same emotions and sharing the same 
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 thoughts.” At this time of opportunity for change, Eskandar suggested that a new 
kind of nationhood could take hold in Egypt. 
This article presents ethnographic research into blogs that, like Eskandar’s, 
were written by Egyptians in English in the year after the Egyptian revolution of 
2011. This category of blogs, known as bridgeblogs, is commonly understood in 
academic literature as primarily intended for a foreign audience, because they are 
written in English. However, I examine bloggers’ involvement in national 
political dialogue oriented towards a domestic audience. Specifically, I focus on 
their discussions of nationhood, during this key period for re-envisioning the 
nation of Egypt. As the above passages from Eskandar’s blog Notes from the 
Underground suggest, bloggers who had been actively involved in the revolution 
discussed new visions and opportunities for the Egyptian nation. Through 
ethnographies of five blogs written in English, I will explore the ways the 
bloggers participated in conversations about the Egyptian nation, presenting 
diverse visions of nationhood, yet often invoking of the resounding spirit of 
protests in Tahrir. I argue that by taking part in discussion about the shape of the 
nation, bridgebloggers are in fact highly engaged in domestic political dialogue, 
dedicated to political causes within the country, and oriented towards both 
domestic and international audiences.  
In the following section, I provide an introduction to the Egyptian 
blogosphere and briefly review existing literature on bridgeblogging. In the third 
section, I consider the concept of the nation, and situate this project within Lila 
Abu-Lughod’s (2005) study of the Egyptian nation through television and John 
Kelly and Martha Kaplan’s (2001) theoretical framework for studying nationhood. 
The fourth section explains the methodology that shaped this research. The fifth 
section, which is at the ethnographic heart of this article, presents an 
ethnographical exploration of each blog and its discussion of nationhood. In the 
sixth section, I discuss the shared and divergent claims of nationhood in each blog 
and characterize these blogs’ engagement in national political dialogue. The 
seventh section, the conclusion, offers some final thoughts on my findings and the 
implications for our understanding of bridgeblogs. 
 
THE EGYPTIAN BLOGOSPHERE & BRIDGEBLOGS 
 
From the advent of the Egyptian blogosphere in the early 2000s (Radsch 2008), 
Egyptians have used blogging as a platform for political discourse, engagement, 
and activism. Early bloggers were generally young, liberal, and anti-establishment. 
As Kefaya, a protest movement against Hosni Mubarak, developed from 2004-
2005, a “natural symbiosis between Egypt’s early core bloggers and the emerging 
protest movement helped popularize the Egyptian blogosphere as a site of protest” 
(2008, 2-3). Subsequently, the blogosphere thrived as a venue for activism. Many 
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 bloggers knew each other in person from offline meetings and joint political 
actions. As the blogosphere began to grow and diversify, “cyberactivism” became 
a more established practice, though at the same time, with the spread of blogging, 
there was much greater variety in the content of blogs and the demographics of 
bloggers (2008).  
Scholars of new media have sought to understand the political significance 
of blogs in Egypt and across the Arab world in greater depth. For instance, 
Hirschkind (2010) has argued that blogs create spaces to transcend traditional 
political divides, while Hamdy and Gomaa (2012) have argued that blogs portray 
news events through a human interest lens distinct from other forms of media. 
With respect to blogs written in English, scholars have argued that they act as a 
medium of international information sharing.  
Zuckerman identifies blogs written in English but published in a non-
English speaking country as “bridgeblogs”. In an early article about 
bridgeblogging, Zuckerman (2008) distinguishes bridgeblogging as one of three 
types of activity characteristic of Arab political bloggers. He offers the following 
definition: 
 
Bridgeblogs are weblogs that reach across gaps of language, 
culture and nationality to enable interpersonal communication. 
They are distinguished from the vast majority of blogs by their 
intended audience: while most blogs are targeted to friends, family 
or countrymen, bridgeblogs are intended to be read by an audience 
from a different nation, religion, or culture. A Tanzanian blogging 
in Kiswahili about local politics is not bridgeblogging; a Tanzanian 
blogging in English about Tanzanian politics, explaining the 
position of the politicians mentioned and the context of the issues 
debated, is bridgeblogging (48). 
 
Bridgeblogs are characteristically identified by their use of a language other than 
the language native to the bloggers’ country—primarily English. According to 
Zuckermans’ analysis, this linguistic choice indicates a blog that primarily 
endeavors to provide a political primer for an international audience. 
The little scholarship available on bridgeblogs shares this narrow view of 
their purposes and political significance. Lynch (2007) emphasizes the role that 
these blogs play in reaching Western audiences, noting that Arab bridgebloggers 
disproportionately attract the attention of Western media, as compared to bloggers 
who write in their native language. Though he notes that some bloggers can 
occupy multiple categories, he generally takes a limited view on the political 
engagement of bridgebloggers. “They often stand aloof from their own national 
politics” (17), he writes.  
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 This analysis assumes that the sole reason for use of English is to connect 
to an international audience, ignoring the presence of an English-speaking elite in 
countries such as Egypt, among other factors in the choice to write in English. 
Moreover, this analysis implies that bloggers who write in English are less 
involved in political dialogue within their country than bloggers who write in their 
native language, as their audience is not their fellow countrymen. In contrast, this 
article pursues a deep ethnographic study of bridgeblogs to explore their 
engagements in national politics and with domestic audiences, seeking a more 
multifaceted understanding of bloggers who write in English.  
My focus on bridgeblogs arises from the relative lack of focus on, and 
seemingly insufficient understanding of, this particular corner of the Egyptian 
blogosphere. This article will not attempt to draw any comparative conclusions 
regarding Arabic and English blogs in Egypt, though it will make note of certain 
bloggers who make use of both languages. Rather, this article will engage in a 
close reading of a selection of bridgeblogs in order to better understand the 
significance of the political writings within.  
 
THEORIZING THE NATION 
 
This article locates bridgebloggers’ engagement in national politics in their 
participation in discussions about the shape and future of Egyptian nationhood. In 
considering nationhood, it is important to acknowledge the subtleties and 
difficulties of that term. The “nation” is not intended here as a homogenizing, 
hegemenizing concept. Against the risk that the concept of the nation elides 
differences and frictions, Claudio Lomnitz-Adler has described “’a national space’ 
rife with tensions, inequalities, and regionally configured power systems” (in 
Abu-Lughod 2005, 9) and Partha Chatterjee (1993) has written of “the nation and 
its fragments”. These formulations draw attention to the disjointed, contentious 
nature of the nation.  
After the 2011 revolution, the Egyptian nation was highly fractured, which 
this article acknowledges through exploration of the specific, varied forms of 
nationhood described and envisioned by bloggers.1 Taking heed of the fragmented, 
tense nature of the nation suggests that the visions of nationhood offered by these 
bloggers, not shared by the majority of Egyptians and not supported by strong 
institutions of powers, are yet important. Anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod 
furthermore notes, “Rather than studying ‘the nation’ or any particular nation, we 
                                                        
1 Abu-Lughod writes, “The 1990s signify a particularly complex political moment in Egypt’s 
national history when the hegemony of one vision, of which state media was to be an instrument, 
was seriously eroding” (2005, 14). If the hegemony of a single, state-sponsored vision of nation 
was eroding in the 1990s, through much of 2011, there was no state authority capable of putting 
forth a commanding vision of nationhood. 
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 must admit that we are always studying nations at particular moments in their 
histories” (2005, 14). The study of Egyptian nationhood at hand is neither a study 
of nationhood writ large nor a study of any permanent, intrinsic qualities of 
nationhood. Rather, it examines dialogue about the nation at a time that seemed to 
make possible a momentous reconfiguration of Egyptian political authority and 
nationhood.  
Abu-Lughod has argued that media can construct particular forms of 
nationhood. In Egypt in the 1990s, television serials served a pedagogical role in 
promoting certain national ideologies, shifting from themes of developmentalism 
to themes of consumerism to mirror Egypt’s political trajectory and encroaching 
globalization. The vision of nationhood depicted on television found mixed 
reception among Egypt’s impoverished citizens whose “realities [did] not 
correspond to the promises of national television” (2005, 242). Importantly for 
this role in producing a sense of nationhood, television serials are widely popular 
Egypt. Blogs do not have nearly as wide circulation as television serials, but 
nonetheless also offer a medium to propose, critique, and defend different ideas 
about nationhood for an Egyptian audience.  
Moreover, television is largely a top-down enterprise in Egypt. Though 
Abu-Lughod notes that the production of television serials involves the 
collaborative work of many individuals and should not be mistaken as emanating 
directly from the state (2005, 88), it is yet a medium of few producers and many 
consumers. Blogging, on the other hand, is a medium of many producers. On 
television, only certain individuals have access to the means of production, but the 
media circulates widely. Others may contest the viability or accuracy of the nation 
represented in this media because it does not accord with their own experiences. 
Blogging, alternatively, is a platform that enables those with an Internet 
connection and the desire to publish their thoughts to do so. Importantly, this does 
not mean that all Egyptians have equal access to blogging or that bloggers are 
representative of the Egyptian voice at large. Nonetheless, it does allow for those 
individuals who do maintain a blog to express their opinions. Furthermore, 
whereas the state was able to maintain a dominating influence over television 
serials, bloggers are far less subject to state control. While television serials may 
present a more dominant vision of nationhood, bloggers propose ideas about 
nationhood that are more tenuous, emerging and evolving as the political situation 
changes. 
In the blogs discussed below, bridgebloggers demonstrate strong 
commitments to national politics by passionately narrating their ideas about 
Egyptian nationhood. Kaplan and Kelly, among others, have argued that greater 
attention must be paid toward national narratives, proposing that narrative is 
crucial in filling in the content of national spaces. “Narratives are proposed that 
connect people to their rulers as one people, versus outside others” (2001, 141). 
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 This argument turns attention away from the political power structures that may 
provide the skeleton of the nation and towards the means of creating and 
perpetuating a national character. Kelly expands upon the importance of narrative 
elsewhere, arguing, “’The nation’ itself is a narrative” (1995, 257). From this 
theoretical stance, the nation is a ground for contestation, rather than an essential 
substance (257-258). The contested nature of the nation opens the possibility for 
bloggers to assert visions of nationhood that contradict with each other or with 
authoritative versions of the nation.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This article comprises a close ethnographic reading of five English-language 
blogs, all written by Egyptians who were involved in the 2011 revolution. It is 
difficult to quantify the proportion of Egyptian blogs that are written in English. 
Notably, in a 2009 Berkman Center report on the Arabic blogosphere, the 
Egyptian cluster did not include an Egyptian-English bridge subcluster, as was the 
case for other clusters discussed in the report (Etling et al.). In 2006, an Egyptian 
blog aggregator run by prominent bloggers Alaa Abd El Fattah and Manal Hassan 
included 1,500 blogs, of which more than half were Arabic (Zuckerman 2006). 
Though the blogosphere has matured significantly since then and its 
demographics have likely shifted, it is reasonable to assert that a meaningful 
portion of Egyptian blogs is written in English. 
The five blogs studied in this article are all relatively prominent within the 
Egyptian blogosphere. It is again difficult to quantify this prominence; it was 
gauged qualitatively based on my exploration of the blogosphere and the ease 
with which a casual reader may find these blogs, through links from outside 
sources and from each other.2 The five blogs are Rantings of a Sandmonkey, An 
Arab Citizen, The Big Pharaoh, Notes from the Underground, and Egyptian 
Chronicles. Selecting for more prominent blogs attempts to ensure greater quality 
and regularity of posting, but beyond that, is not highly relevant, as the diversity 
of the blogosphere prevents any small fraction of blogs from being representative. 
Based on available data, readership of the blogs varies widely. Web 
analytics provider Alexa lists the five blogs in its global rankings in the following 
ascending order of popularity: Notes from the Underground, The Big Pharaoh, 
Rantings of a Sandmonkey, An Arab Citizen, and Egyptian Chronicles (Table 1).3 
The global rankings reaffirm that there is a wide range in the size of the blogs’ 
audiences. Furthermore, the rankings provided for other Egyptian news websites 
                                                        
2 For example, two of the blogs studied here were listed in a 2013 Daily Beast post titled “Six Best 
Egypt Bloggers to Follow.” http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/30/six-best-egypt-
bloggers-to-follow.html.  
3 Data captured on 15 April 2015. Relative rankings may – and have likely – changed since 2011. 
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 in Table 1 suggest that the blogs do have a significantly smaller readership than 
mainstream media.  
 
Table 1. Global Ranks for Blogs with Comparisons  
Rankings are drawn from Alexa (www.alexa.com), which calculates a website’s global rank based 
on a combination of the site’s average daily visitors and page views on the site over the past three 
months.  
Site Global Rank 
Blog Rankings 
Notes from the Underground 12,845,540  
The Big Pharaoh 9,145,531 
Rantings of a Sandmonkey 6,924,659 
An Arab Citizen 2,183,819 
Egyptian Chronicles 1,474,097 
Rankings of Comparison Sites 
Jadaliyya (Independent e-zine with analysis of 
the Arab World, http://www.jadaliyya.com/) 
166,553 
Daily News Egypt (Independent English-
language newspaper, http://www.ahram.org.eg/)  
40,944 
Al-Ahram (Egyptian state newspaper, 
http://www.ahram.org.eg/)  
2,717 
 
This article considers posts on each blog from January to December 2011, 
all accessed between December 2013 and April 2014. This period effectively 
begins with the revolution that overthrew Mubarak and ends with the first 
parliamentary elections succeeding the revolution, encompassing numerous other 
events of political significance, including a constitutional referendum and many 
prominent protests. A year’s worth of observation material provides sufficient 
time to build a complex understanding of each blog; for bloggers who only post a 
few times per month, any shorter time scale would likely prove insufficient. 
Furthermore, this year was an important window in Egypt’s political development 
post-Mubarak, and a particularly fruitful period of time to propose new 
conceptions of nationhood. 
 This article rests upon an ethnographic sensibility in order to pay careful 
attention to the voices of bloggers and their dialogue about nationhood. In the 
introduction to the volume Political Ethnography, Edward Schatz describes an 
ethnographic sensibility as “an approach that cares…to glean the meanings that 
the people under study attribute to their social and political reality” (2009, 5). I 
hope, with this approach, to “[produce] detailed evidence of the sort that can flesh 
out, or call into question, generalizations produced or meanings assigned by other 
research traditions” (10).  
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 BLOGGING THE NATION 
This section engages in an ethnographic reading of the five blogs to discuss the 
visions of Egyptian politics and nationhood that each blog puts forth. It also 
introduces information about the authors of the five blogs and the blogs 
themselves, in order to build a basic, if limited and partial, understanding of the 
context of the blog posts discussed.  
 
SANDMONKEY 
 
Blogger Mahmoud Salem has been writing on his blog, Rantings of a 
Sandmonkey, since 2006. He writes almost exclusively in English, and published 
an average of 2.33 posts every month throughout 2011. He posted between one to 
five times per month, with the exception of November, when the blog was silent. 
The blogroll on the margins of the webpage—that is, the sidebar where bloggers 
often link to other blogs—had an extensive list of links to both Arabic and 
English blogs, throughout the Middle East and North Africa region, though many 
of the links were defunct or the blogs were outdated.4 Rantings of a Sandmonkey 
has a strong political focus, and posts often address general principles and big 
picture concerns rather than day-to-day activism.  
Salem studied business at Northeastern University and worked in 
investment banking and marketing upon his return to Egypt. He began the blog at 
age twenty-three, writing under the pseudonym Sandmonkey. He did not reveal 
his identity until the 2011 revolution, after the police arrested him during the 
protests. He has explained why he began blogging:  
 
It was all about, “Someone on the Internet is wrong, and I must 
correct it”…I guess I had a reverse culture shock by how closed 
the entire society was…You know, there was no freedom, 
conformity was everywhere. And people spouted truisms as if they 
were true. There was no argument…[This was] the natural 
conclusion to an educational system based on memorization and 
not critical thinking. I wanted to confront some truisms that were 
existing in the Egyptian mind (Gitlin 2011, 5). 
 
Salem chose to blog in English because he hoped it would help him evade 
censorship, on one hand, and, on the other hand, reach the elite. Notably, 
Zuckerman (2008) does not consider either of these reasons as motivations for 
bloggers to write in English. At the time, Salem felt any political change would 
have to come from Egypt’s elite, though he has since changed his views (2011, 6). 
                                                        
4 As of April 2015, Sandmonkey’s blog had been redesigned and this blogroll had been removed. 
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 He hoped that blogging in English would enable him to communicate openly and 
effectively to a target demographic within Egypt.  
 A recurring theme in the blog posts throughout 2011 was the divide 
between the revolutionaries (sometimes referred to as “the protestors”) and the 
people (also addressed as “the general public” and “the silent majority”). This 
division emerged while the protests that toppled Mubarak were still underway. 
Sandmonkey was closely attuned to the people who saw the revolution as an 
unwanted disruption in their lives. On February 6 he wrote, “I am sorry that your 
lives and businesses are disrupted, but this wasn't caused by the Protesters. The 
Protesters aren't the ones who shut down the internet that has paralyzed your 
businesses and banks: The government did.” He went on to list several more 
charges against the protestors that he believed the government was actually 
responsible for.  
Again and again, Sandmonkey would return to this relationship between 
the revolutionaries, the people, and the state. He discussed how the 
revolutionaries and the people were divided, but argued that the real enemy 
should have been whoever was wielding state power—initially, the government, 
but later on, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the military. 
If national narratives often attempt to create bonds between people, in this 
moment of revolution, Sandmonkey aimed to exclude the ruling class from the 
Egyptian nation while uniting all others. He attempted to align the interests of the 
citizenry against the state. 
 Nonetheless, the antagonism between the revolutionaries and the general 
public became more apparent after the constitutional referendum in March, in 
which the activist campaign to vote no failed. Sandmonkey pointed out that this 
failure was due primarily to the reality that only a small fraction of Egyptians 
participated in the revolution; the campaign to vote no did not reach the rest of the 
population, and particularly not the population outside of Cairo. His hope of 
creating a united nation of Egyptian citizens had failed thus far. This is not to say 
that a divided electorate cannot constitute a united nation; however, given that this 
vote was on a matter of national constitution, it revealed a failure in the 
revolutionaries’ ability to build popular buy-in for their vision of the future of the 
nation. In a post addressed “Dear Jan25 people,” he wrote, “You no longer 
represent the people. You really don’t, at least when it comes to their concerns.” 
In response to this growing gap, Sandmonkey urged the revolutionaries to 
strengthen their grassroots organizing and pay greater attention to the general 
public’s desires, envisioning a nation in which the revolutionaries built support 
and created greater consensus. 
He also used his blog as a venue to urge the people to join in the 
revolutionary movement. In a post on March 23, 2011 addressed to the “Dear 
Free People of Egypt,” he recognized the people’s concerns, but also wrote 
9
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 persuasively of the comparative freedoms of a state regime versus the democratic 
government he envisioned the revolutionaries bringing about. In conclusion, he 
wrote, “As you can see, what we are asking for is totally unrealistic and we are 
completely dedicated to destroying ourselves. If we are truly such a problem, we 
urge you to help us make that happen, so we can get out of your hair as soon as 
possible. But if you are insane and unreasonable like the rest of us, please join us 
and help us.” Here Sandmonkey attempted to convince the people that the ideals 
and values of the revolution were worth fighting for, and provided a vision of all 
Egyptians fighting together to shape their nation. 
The way in which Sandmonkey addressed his letters to the revolutionaries 
and the people revealed how he positioned himself in relation to each of these 
categories. In writing to “Jan25 people” he drew upon a popular Twitter hashtag 
used to catalogue tweets about the revolution, #jan25. In this context, it served as 
a shared identifier and asserted the legitimacy of his assessments of the current 
state of the revolutionary movement. He also signed the earlier post he addressed 
to the people as “Mahmoud Salem (A Jan25 Protestor).” In this earlier post, he 
wrote to “Free People of Egypt.” This form of address seems to cast as wide a net 
as possible, though it becomes clear he was truly addressing those who opposed 
the activists. “Free” reminded the Egyptian reader of his or her rights as a citizen, 
for which Sandmonkey urged him or her to fight. “Of Egypt” created the sense of 
unity that he was trying to promote amongst Egyptians. Thus, while his 
identification as a “Jan25 Protestor” rooted him in the protests of Tahrir in 
January and February, his form of address to others emphasized their agency and 
ability to join in his cause.  
For ten months after the revolution, Sandmonkey remained highly 
optimistic about Egypt’s prospects. He focused on encouraging protestors to form 
strong political organizations that would enable them to accrue power and support 
from the people. As early as February 6, amidst ongoing protests to topple 
Mubarak, he urged protestors across Egypt to gather contact information for 
participants in the protests: “with such Proper citizen organization and 
segmentation, we’ll have the contact information and location of all the protesters 
that showed up, and that could be transformed into voting blocks in parliamentary 
districts.” In this way, the revolutionaries would be able to assume political power 
and bring their vision for the nation to fruition. Sandmonkey continued to be a 
strong proponent of political organization throughout 2011, posting a guide to 
forming a campaign and continually urging activists to build grassroots support 
for their cause. In late 2011, he ran unsuccessfully for a seat in parliament and 
managed a winning campaign for another candidate. 
During the campaigns, he was absent from posting for over a month. In 
the two posts that he wrote after the campaign, he was sad and unhopeful about 
Egypt’s future, disappointed by what he saw as the Egyptian people’s submission 
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 to the army and ashamed of what the revolution had failed to accomplish. The 
revolutionaries had not been able to bring about the new Egyptian nation they 
envisioned. And yet, he wrote, “We get it. We get your fears, your hate, your 
deeply nurtured prejudices, and we refuse to give up on you.” Though his ideas 
about the future of the nation—of Egyptian people united, and of all citizens 
joining in the cause of revolutionary change—were failing to gain ground, he 
continued to use his blog to engage with citizens, both allies and opponents, in 
dialogue about the nation. 
 
AN ARAB CITIZEN 
 
The masthead for the blog An Arab Citizen has both the blog’s title and its 
slogan—“Covers Egypt, the Region, and current affairs”—in Arabic and English. 
The posts are likewise a mix of English and Arabic, with an increasing portion of 
posts in English throughout 2011. The blog’s first post was in January 2011. The 
author of the blog, Bassem Sabry, was one of the more prolific bloggers among 
the five studied here. Over the rest of the year, he published between one and 
thirty-eight new posts almost every month, for an average of 14.58 posts per 
month.5 The blogroll links to three other blogs: two are Arabic-language blogs, 
and the third is Egyptian Chronicles, which is discussed below. A widget allows 
readers to translate the blog into various languages using Google Translate. Sabry 
describes himself on Twitter as a media and political consultant. As a political 
commentator, since starting this blog, he has been interviewed numerous times by 
the international media and has contributed pieces in several English-language 
publications.  
Sabry seemed to use his blog far more as a means of building his own 
career than any of the other bloggers profiled here. In some of his early posts, he 
urged readers to like, comment, and share the post in a short standard message at 
the bottom of the post. A few of his commentaries also included 
acknowledgements at the end, listing those who provided contributions and 
feedback along with their Twitter handle; this linked Sabry to a network of 
Egyptian political commentators. He perhaps positioned himself as a node within 
a web of national political actors more consciously than the other bloggers at hand. 
 Sabry wrote about numerous countries in the Middle East, in particular, 
Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen, with a strong emphasis on Egypt, as he is Egyptian. 
The focus of An Arab Citizen is generally political, but includes much content on 
media more generally. For example, the first post published in English was a 
personal note on “losing the magic of music.” Overall, the English-language posts 
primarily fall into three broad categories: posting copies or translations of relevant 
                                                        
5  The blog seems to have gone defunct in 2013. The last entry on the blog was posted on 
September 9, 2013, as observed in April 2015. 
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 political documents, sharing interesting political media, and personal thoughts or 
political analysis. While Sabry’s most pro-active engagement in conversations 
about nationhood may be found in the third category, the first two categories of 
content also provide important contextual material for Sabry’s contribution to 
building a new vision of the nation. 
 Sabry posted a range of political documents in 2011, mainly regarding 
proposed laws and the constitution. In one such post of the proposed 
constitutional principles, originally published by the daily paper Al Masry Al 
Youm, he explained, “I'm mirroring it here on the blog as I do with all important 
documents, again for easy future access and documentation.” Thus, it seems this 
category of posts was both for his readers’ benefit, in providing access to 
important documents, and for his own records. This act could be understood as a 
means of creating shared memory of the post-revolution political processes 
through documentation and building a repository of important documentation 
regarding the new Egyptian nation thought possible after the 2011 revolution. 
 The content of the posts in which he shared political media ranged from a 
series of photo collections of Arab leaders, including Mubarak and Gaddafi, to a 
music video entitled “Gaddafi’s Hat,” by the maker of another popular music 
video of Gaddafi, “Zanga Zanga.” The media Sabry posted tended not to be 
Egypt-specific, but to have broader origins in the Arab world. This suggests he 
felt a heightened sense of solidarity with people and politics across the Middle 
East and North Africa, perhaps engaging in the interconnected opportunities for 
narrating new visions of nationhood opened by the Arab Spring. 
 Political and personal commentary made up the largest portion of Sabry’s 
posts in English, and most clearly communicated his visions of nationhood. Some 
posts were links to articles and interviews given elsewhere, such as an article on 
Mohamed El Baradei that he wrote for Bikya Masr.  
 In the substantive political commentary that Sabry posted on his blog, he 
did not seem to write often as an activist with a strong ideological stance, as 
Sandmonkey did; rather, his approach was frequently more intellectual. His 
writing displayed a familiarity with Western political thought and complex 
political ideologies, such as a post that “explores meaning of Centrism, Third 
Way, and Social Liberalism, and talks about their future in a new Arab World” 
and another post comparing Egyptian and American politics. One post with an 
Indian parable on fear suggests that his thinking is highly cosmopolitan.  
In July, Sabry hinted at his political leanings in a series of three lengthy 
posts analyzing why Egyptians no longer supported the revolution. Before 
enumerating a list of reasons why the revolutionaries had failed to maintain public 
support, he explained:  
 
12
Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Multidisciplinary Studies, Vol. 4 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://ir.uiowa.edu/mathal/vol4/iss1/7
DOI: 10.17077/2168-538X.1061
 The entire experience of the revolution revealed many things about 
the psyche and mentality of the standard Egyptian. The largest 
majority of Egyptians are politically conservative…In fact, I would 
say many Egyptians didn't necessarily "Love" Mubarak, but didn't 
hate him either…A truth is that a significant number of Egyptians 
are either uneducated, undereducated, or truly depend on the 
national media and "common first story heard from a friend" for 
news and opinion, and they grew used to the National Media's 
constant illusionary newsfeed that portrayed images of stability 
and growth…Within the Egyptians are true revolutionaries who 
fought against the government in much more dangerous times, in 
the 60s and 70s and 80s and 90s. I am speaking however, in my 
view, about a significant percentage of Egypt. 
 
In this passage, rather than proposing a new vision of nationhood, he implicitly 
critiques the existing national dynamics.  
Other posts offered greater clarity on his stake in Egypt’s fractured 
political landscape and how this informed his thinking about the nation. Sabry 
identified as a supporter of and participant in the Tahrir protests in a series of 
posts at the end of November, on the eve of parliamentary elections. These posts 
were some of the most clearly politicized writings that he published throughout 
the year. In one post, he argued that boycotting the elections would be futile, 
concluding, “with a heavy heart, I will vote. Then return to Tahrir...” In another 
post, he noted that though the demands of Tahrir activists had previously been 
vague and not cohesive, the activists were now presenting a unified demand for “a 
national salvation government with full authority.” He reflected, “It is remarkable 
to see the evolution of a revolution.” Thus, though his blog acted more often as a 
collection of media and political analysis than as a space to elaborate a manifesto 
or expression of personal politics, Sabry did occasionally use it to express his 
personal political beliefs. His admiration for the way in which the revolution had 
developed into what he perceived as a more cohesive political unit suggests that 
he perhaps hoped this movement would present a viable alternative vision of 
nationhood.  
Nonetheless, Sabry also invited critical discussion of Tahrir by sharing the 
thoughts of a friend who wrote, “You people in Tahrir are doing almost 
everything you claim to hate about the former and current regime…You Tahrir 
people are trying to impose your will on us.” By presenting opposing views, 
Sabry created a space on his blog to discuss different viewpoints on what the 
nation was and could become. While Sabry may not have presented a clear, 
holistic vision of nationhood in his blog posts, he participated in critical 
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 discussion of how individuals and movements could collaboratively create such a 
vision. 
 
THE BIG PHARAOH 
 
The Big Pharaoh blog was founded in 2004, modeled after Iraqi blogs to share 
information about the region. One of the first posts answered a variety of general 
questions about Egypt and Egyptians that seemed to be geared towards a Western 
audience. Big Pharaoh is a Coptic Christian, a minority in Egypt. He left blogging 
in 2008; upon his return in February 2011, he explained that he felt frustrated that 
despite a significant amount of media coverage, nothing had changed in Egypt 
during his first blogging stint. Big Pharaoh began posting regularly again in May 
2011, and thereafter published one to four new posts almost every month, with an 
average of 1.83 posts per month throughout the year. All of his posts are in 
English. His blogroll links largely to outdated or defunct blogs—though 
Sandmonkey is included—in Egypt and across the Middle East. He also links to 
media mentions of his pre-2008 blogging, largely in Western publications, 
including NPR, BBC, and the Christian Science Monitor.  
 A prominent theme in Big Pharaoh’s blog in 2011 was the Egyptian army. 
His posts conveyed an increasingly strong anti-army sentiment throughout the 
year. One of his first posts published after the revolution speculated on the role of 
the army in the coming months. He provided two scenarios: either the army would 
soon squash the revolutionaries and take control, or it would ensure a smooth 
democratic transition so long as it was clear that its own power was not to be 
diminished. Big Pharaoh suggested that the second scenario was more likely, 
although by May, he decried the army’s one-sided decision making. Later, he 
began to speculate that the army was plotting against the activists, for instance, by 
inciting violence at a protest in July. By August, he wrote, “It is crystal clear 
SCAF wants to intimate [sic] and eventually get rid of its last critics: the youth 
who did the revolution and their supporters,” and he blamed SCAF for 
exacerbating the rift between the revolutionaries and the general public. Big 
Pharaoh seemed to view the army as a threat to the Egyptian nation, and 
attempted to write it out of the national collectivity by questioning its legitimacy 
as an organization aligned with the people. 
A majority of Big Pharaoh’s posts attempted to explain current events by 
surmising what the cloaked intentions of certain players, often the army, may 
have been. Thus, after protestors stormed the Israeli embassy in September, he 
speculated that the army allowed this to happen. In the wake of the massacre of 
protesting Copts at the Maspero building in October, he proposed four competing 
explanations: supporters of the old regime infiltrated the protests and incited 
violence, a radical Christian shot at the army, SCAF instigated the violence, or 
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 SCAF attempted to pit Christian radicals against Muslim radicals to win over the 
street. None of these scenarios are backed up by convincing evidence, but Big 
Pharaoh believed that the powerful players in Egyptian politics were deeply 
invested in retaining power and thus subject to strong suspicion. In these instances, 
Big Pharaoh offered alternative narratives to explain events of national 
importance and to write these events into his own vision of nationhood, largely 
reinforcing his anti-army sentiments.  
 Big Pharaoh also wrote in strong opposition to Islamists and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. However, showing sensitivity to political realities, he predicted the 
Brotherhood’s election victories, indicating an awareness that all Egyptians did 
not share his political views and vision of the nation. In a post on August 16, 2011, 
Big Pharaoh outlined what he thought Egypt would be like under Muslim 
Brotherhood rule in the worst-case scenario. He concluded, “A government with a 
strong MB [Muslim Brotherhood] presence can be tolerable and intolerable. 
Depends on where you draw the line. And depends on how long you can wait till 
an alternative emerges and till Egyptians, like their Iranian counterparts, discover 
that those who manipulate them using religion are not worthy of their votes.” This 
implied appeal to his fellow Egyptians asked them to support a more secular 
government, revealing a strong bias against a religious government in Big 
Pharaoh’s vision of the nation. 
 As a Coptic Christian himself, Big Pharaoh devoted particular attention to 
the struggles of this group in post-revolutionary Egypt and suggested a prominent 
role for Copts in the nation. In a post memorializing a young Copt who died at 
Maspero, Mina Danial, he asserted that Copts had an important stake in being 
active in Egyptian politics. He noted that it was commonly assumed that Copts 
were absent during the protests that toppled Mubarak because their pope ordered 
them not to participate. However, he countered this assumption by stating that 
numerous Copts disobeyed the pope and did participate in the protests. He 
concluded, “The blood of Mina calls out to Christians to follow in his footsteps. 
To get out of their churches, their ghettos, and join their Muslim fellow 
countrymen in changing the future of this country even if it looks bleak today. 
There is simply no other alternative.” Interestingly, he never used “we” in talking 
about the Coptic community and did not directly address his comments to anyone 
in particular, thus refraining from explicitly identifying himself with the Copts. 
Nonetheless, his membership in the Coptic community shed light on his 
opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood and his particular vision of nationhood. He 
urged his Coptic audience to pursue active participation in shaping the nation, as 
Sandmonkey had also urged his readers to participate. 
 One of Big Pharaoh’s most popular posts of 2011, attracting over one 
hundred comments, was an ironic proposal to form the Republic of Heliopolis. 
Writing in December after the parliamentary elections, Big Pharaoh stated that in 
15
Sacco: Blogging, Nationhood, and the Egyptian Revolution: Rethinking Bri
Published by Iowa Research Online, 2015
 order to become a citizen of this republic, “you have to be an open minded person 
who does not mind the diversity of our country. You will have to keep religion to 
yourself and not force it on other fellow countrymen.” In a follow-up post, the 
republic developed into a federation with Nasr City; neither of these districts 
elected a Muslim Brother or Salafi candidate. This utopia embodied Big 
Pharaoh’s notion of nationhood as a space of diversity and tolerance. It suggests 
that his beliefs were perhaps, in fact, pluralist, but he did not believe that the 
Brotherhood shared the same values, and thus he condemned the group.  
 In his final post of the year, Big Pharaoh clarified that he did not actually 
want to live in the Republic of Heliopolis. He wanted to live in the Republic of 
Tahrir. He described Tahrir as “a utopia…a dream. A place that enabled us, 
Egyptians, to overcome many of our ills.” This was one of the few moments when 
Big Pharaoh focused on the optimism of the revolution rather than the missteps 
and injustices of the ensuing political processes. In his view, Tahrir was a place 
where all of the perceived shortcomings of Egyptians were reversed. It was clear 
that the legacy of Tahrir continued to inspire his political action: “I tend to look at 
Tahrir as a mental state. As a seed that was planted in this country. And just like 
any seed, it is destined to grow. This is the reason why they’re doing everything 
to choke it. Because if Tahrir came out of Tahrir, this country will change forever 
and threaten whatever interests they’re trying to protect.” Thus, he portrayed 
Tahrir as the ideal antithesis to the struggle for political power in Egypt. Like 
Sandmonkey, Big Pharaoh memorialized the harmony of Tahrir, and its legacy 
inspired his vision for Egypt.  
 
NOTES FROM THE UNDERGROUND 
 
Wael Eskandar has been blogging on Notes from the Underground since 2006, 
and through 2011 he posted between 2 and 8 times every month, with an average 
of 5.83 posts per month. He describes himself as a writer and journalist, and he 
has written for numerous Egyptian media outlets. According to his Blogger 
profile, he has cosmopolitan tastes; he lists Pink Floyd as his favorite musician, 
and his list of favorite books includes Russian, British, and Arab literature. He 
follows three blogs via Blogger, including An Arab Citizen. The sidebar on 
Eskandar’s blog lists his Twitter handle and highlights popular previous posts. His 
blogroll links to a few, mainly non-political blogs. The site visit counter shows 
178,372 visits.6  
Eskandar blogs exclusively in English, but his posts seem intended for an 
audience of Egyptian nationals and foreigners. At times, he addressed his posts 
directly at those who are outside of the country, such as a post from early 2011 
                                                        
6 As of April 15, 2015. 
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 that provides instruction in evading government censorship of social media sites 
during the revolution. The post began, “To anyone who stumbles upon this, please 
share with Egyptians.” With this tactic, Eskandar seemed to call upon existing 
multivectored links of communication between Egyptians and internationals. 
Nonetheless, the need to explicitly address foreign readers in some posts may 
suggest that they were only part of a wider audience with whom Eskandar 
engaged.  
As a journalist, Eskandar has occasionally been called upon to offer his 
own testimony and analysis of Egyptian politics. He posted videos of interviews 
he gave on Al Jazeera and Alhurra, a U.S.-funded, Arabic-language news channel 
broadcast in the Middle East. In early February, he expressed this role in a blog 
post, writing, “I’m asked often how I feel about what’s going on in my country. 
I’m asked for news while I follow the news on Al Jazeera, twitter, friends from 
the scene or what have you.” In these instances, he was called upon to serve the 
definitional role of a bridgeblogger, translating news for international audiences. 
 However, Eskandar’s blogging was far more complex than that. Eskandar 
engaged deeply with Egyptian nationhood through personal reflections on Egypt’s 
political situation in 2011, as demonstrated in the introduction to this article. He 
wrote of complex, conflicting emotions following the downfall of Mubarak: 
“Much of this is emotional; unlike many, my heart is not all filled with 
celebration. I’m filled with fear, with joy, and with remorse.” To a foreign 
audience, this may have been taken as an account of Egyptians’ reactions to the 
revolution, but to other Egyptians, this may have been a thoughtful provocation to 
consider their own reaction. Eskandar’s blog arguably served both communities.  
Eskandar’s engagement in discussions about nationhood arose out of his 
time in Tahrir. As early as February, he realized the uniqueness of the Tahrir 
community, much as other bloggers later memorialized Tahrir. Eskandar wrote: 
 
We found something in Tahrir that we’ve missed for so long, 
indeed it may be something many haven’t ever found. In Tahrir 
there was unadulterated love of a nation by people who have been 
crushed by it. So many voices silenced in the past, so many talents 
wasted, so many lives not spent well. In Tahrir we found each 
other, we found the true meaning of nationalism. I always hated 
that sentiment though, that pride of belonging to a nation. The 
whole world was my nation, but in Tahrir, I found out what it 
really means. It means your brothers and sisters and your whole 
extended family living in the same place, sharing the same 
emotions and sharing the same thoughts. 
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 Eskandar emphasized the unity—the oneness of emotions and thoughts—that 
characterized the sense of nationhood that arose during the collective action in 
Tahrir. He hoped that the spirit of Tahrir would endure in Egyptian politics, 
writing later in February, “Tahrir is no longer a place we live in, it’s a place that 
lives in us.” The nation, as Eskandar would have it, would take its inspiration 
from the unity and memory of Tahrir. 
Throughout 2011 Eskandar remained devoted to the cause of the revolution 
but decried the lack of progress. By April, he expressed nostalgia for Tahrir: 
 
It’s a time that I miss immensely, where childlike hopes and 
dreams got us together in hopes of changing a nation…My Tahrir 
nostalgia comes not from missing the place, but from missing the 
spirit. It’s a spirit which was crushed for ages under the weight of 
oppression, a spirit which was once told it would never amount to 
anything; that they were young and foolish, and other generations 
were better…That spirit of Tahrir faded for some time, and I look 
back upon it ever so lovingly, missing it.  
 
In identifying his emotion as nostalgia, Eskandar suggested frustration that the 
spirit of Tahrir had not been able to inspire a new nation, and was perhaps even 
dying out. As the spirit of Tahrir faded, Eskandar wrote about his dislike of SCAF 
and the illegitimacy of elections. Like other bloggers, he expressed frustration 
with “the couch party,” and pronounced that no amount of persuasion would 
convince them to join protests in the streets. Nonetheless, he continued to remain 
hopeful about the people of Egypt. In June, he wrote, “The bravery, resilience, 
valor and persistence expressed by people all over Egypt to fight injustice brings 
the cynic in me to his knees.” There were enough continuing revolutionary 
activities for Eskandar to preserve hope that the remaining spirit of Tahrir would 
bring about the nation that he witnessed there.  
 Nonetheless, the institutions for political change being employed in Egypt 
in 2011 did not embody the nationhood that Eskandar envisioned. Rather, he 
voted against the constitutional referendum in March and strongly criticized the 
elections held in December. Numerous posts devoted to the elections suggest that 
Eskandar realized the importance of elections as a possible representative 
institution for the nation, though he wrote that these particular elections were 
neither legitimate, nor free, nor fair.  
 In December, he posted an “Open Letter to My Oppressors,” begging 
these unidentified oppressors to halt their repression. He wrote, “These are real 
lives you are destroying, these are real people whose lives you are taking…Have 
you not that much love in you to see how they too can be loved? Do you not see 
the extent of the damage you have done and are doing to other human beings? 
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 Have you become too selfish and too self-involved to have any kind of sympathy?” 
This appeal reflected the emphasis he placed upon solidarity in Tahrir. Eskandar 
asks for interpersonal recognition of Egypt’s oppressed by their oppressors, which 
would allow them to envision working together, towards a new nation, on 
common grounds. 
 
EGYPTIAN CHRONICLES 
 
The tagline for the blog Egyptian Chronicles is “Egypt That You Don’t Know,” 
which immediately positions the blog as a helpful source of information and 
context for outsiders. The blogger, Zeinobia, describes herself as an “Egyptian 
girl who lives in the present with the glories of the past and hopes in a better 
future for herself and for her country.” She follows an extensive list of other blogs 
in both Arabic and English according to her Blogger profile, and has at times 
maintained two other blogs. One of her other blogs was named “Stuff Egyptian 
People Like,”7 suggesting a fluency in Western culture reinforced by her choices 
of favorite music, movies, and books listed on her Blogger profile. Zeinobia 
seems to be the best networked of the bloggers studied here, with an extensive 
blogroll and links to her profiles on various social media websites. She also links 
to numerous news websites published in the U.S. and the Middle East in the 
sidebar on her blog. Egyptian Chronicles is written entirely in English, though, 
like An Arab Citizen, it has a widget that enables readers to use Google Translate 
to translate the entire website. Zeinobia started blogging in 2004. During 
Mubarak’s presidency her family feared she would encounter censorship or 
punishment, though she did not. She posts with far greater frequency than any of 
the other bloggers studied here; during 2011 she published between 50 and 116 
posts per month, with an average of 79.41 posts per month. This frequency is due 
largely to the nature of her blog, which provides current news updates on a daily 
basis. 
Though Zeinobia may have written primarily as a news source for foreign 
audiences, her involvement in the Egyptian activist and blogger communities and 
the personal viewpoints that she sometimes expressed in her posts positioned her 
as an active participant in Egypt’s political culture in the year after the revolution. 
She described this role on February 12, the day after Mubarak resigned, writing, 
“I am just like a reporter, a biased reporter to her country and her people, the great 
people, the oldest nation in the world.” This statement revealed not only that she 
saw herself as having a stake in the news she reported, but also that she felt great 
allegiance to “her people,” howsoever she imagined that community. 
                                                        
7 Likely a reference to the popular blog (and later book) Stuff White People Like. 
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 Like other bloggers, Zeinobia found a unique, new sense of nationhood in 
Tahrir. She wrote, “My experience in Al Tahrir on February 1, 2011 was unlike 
anything I experienced. All those people from all backgrounds and classes came 
for one reason to express their refusal to Mubarak and his regime. It was with 
strange to see all those people from different classes in one place treating each 
other as if they were one big family [sic].” While Eskandar emphasized the unity 
of the revolution, Zeinobia remarked on the diversity of the participants, who 
were nonetheless able to work together to bring down Mubarak. Moreover, she 
noted that the revolution happened in cities throughout the country—not just 
Cairo—and with participants of all ages, again reinforcing the notion that the 
diversity of the nation was represented in Tahrir Square. This diverse citizenry 
would need to continue to work together in a unified way if it was to build a new 
vision of nationhood. The tension between diversity and unity was at the core of 
her visions of nationhood, which had to address the reality of a fractured society. 
Zeinobia drew a clear boundary between the people, on one hand, and the 
existing government, on the other, excluding the latter from her vision of 
nationhood. In March, she criticized Ahmed Shafik, the interim prime minister at 
the time, for laying claim to the revolution. She wrote, “But the thing that I do not 
understand it is how he claims now that it is ‘our revolution.’ No general it is not 
your revolution, it is our revolution to get rid from Mubarak’s regime and this 
includes you.” The revolution was an important representative moment for the 
people, and she did not want to allow the government to co-opt it. Nonetheless, 
unlike many other bloggers, she remained supportive of the army. This illustrated 
the difficult conflict over which institutions were harmonious with a new 
Egyptian nationhood and which were antithetical to it. 
Throughout the year, Zeinobia continued to track ongoing protests in 
Tahrir, and their success or lack thereof. None of these protests reached nearly the 
same numbers of attendance as the January 25 protests, but organizations 
repeatedly called for “million man protests.” This emphasis on the numerical 
count of protests revealed the importance of participation in order for these to be 
legitimate political expressions of the nation. In May, after a small protest, 
Zeinobia wrote, “For the sake of the country, we should be more than this insh 
Allah [God willing] next week, we should be more diverse in order to represent a 
large sector from the Egyptian people.” Protests continued to be an important 
means of reasserting the nationhood expressed in Tahrir in opposition to the 
government and SCAF. On May 27, the day of one of the more prominent 
protests in 2011, Zeinobia wrote, “Today is the day, today is #May27 where 
thousands we hope to turn in to millions will head to Tahrir square in order to 
remind the government and the SCAF with our demands.” The hashtag #May27 
clearly placed these protests in a genealogy originating in the #Jan25 protests. 
Furthermore, this statement challenged formal representative structures with 
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 grassroots collective action representing the nation. Zeinobia seemed to see the 
nation represented with greater legitimacy by the protests rather than the 
government. 
However, Zeinobia ultimately envisioned transcending protest as a means 
of enacting nationhood. She urged participation in the parliamentary election, 
even getting involved in a campaign to ensure Egyptians abroad would be allowed 
to vote. In November, she wrote, “I think we should think Egypt first before 
anything including the revolution, Egypt is our goal while the revolution is just a 
means.” “Egypt,” here, was not merely a geopolitical entity, but a nation of 
people who were working together to define and shape their very nation. While 
Zeinobia’s post-Mubarak vision of nationhood was firmly rooted in the revolution 
in Tahrir, she hoped this new nation would find harmony with formal institutions 
of government.  
 
NARRATING NATIONHOOD  
 
These bloggers are deeply engaged in national political debates and networks. 
Beyond explaining the current situation to others, they use their blogs to actively 
participate in ongoing political discussions, including discussion about the shape 
of a new nationhood that seemed possible after the revolution. Some bloggers 
more clearly asserted their personal visions for nationhood, such as Sandmonkey 
and the Big Pharaoh. Eskandar and Zeinobia likewise offered unique ideas about 
what Egyptian nationhood might look like. Sabry did not present such a clear 
original vision, but he did participate in building a repository of reference 
documents for framing the new nation forming after the revolution. He also 
discussed and critiqued the ideas about nationhood being put forth by prominent 
political actors, thus amplifying the reach of and refining versions of nationhood 
that he did not invent himself.  
Importantly, the five bloggers did not share a single vision of nationhood. 
While they shared a similar broadly revolutionary ideology, some emphasized 
diversity more than others, such as Big Pharaoh’s attention to the Coptic 
community; some envisioned greater participation by those who had not yet 
joined the streets, including Sandmonkey, who continually appealed to those who 
oppose the revolutionaries; some acquiesced to a greater role for the army in 
Egyptian nationhood, like Zeinobia. The platform of blogging allowed these 
individuals to express their own, unique ideas about the nation, rather than 
demanding that they conform to the official narrative of nationhood.  
Nonetheless, the bloggers’ diverse ideas about the future of the nation 
share a strong grounding in the protests in Tahrir Square between January 25 and 
February 11. The bloggers remembered Tahrir as a space of nearly utopic 
nationhood, and aspired to spread its character to the Egyptian nation at large. 
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 Alongside this hopeful narration of what the Egyptian nation could be like, the 
bloggers discussed the current state of Egyptian nationhood, characterized by 
fragmentation, a lack of trust, and disempowerment. Several of the bloggers 
considered the significance of the popularized division of the “couch party” and 
the protestors, each with a different perspective. Tahrir was positioned in between 
“imaginations of the present and future” and memories of the past (Kelly and 
Kaplan 2001, 36), as the bloggers invoke the nationhood created by the revolution 
both to remember and to inspire the present.  
The bloggers’ engagement with Tahrir places them within a wider public 
debate among revolutionaries and others about the legacy of Tahrir and the future 
of the nation. By contributing to this shared discussion about nationhood through 
their writing, the bloggers participate actively in domestic political networks. 
Though the bloggers did not often directly interact or cite each other, several also 
connected themselves to a domestic network of political players through links to 
other blogs on their own pages.  
The audience of blogs is surely small, and bloggers do not have the 
institutional power to widely disseminate their vision throughout the nation, as do 
Abu-Lughod’s (2005) television producers. However, blogging allows individuals 
inscribe their words publicly and thus gain greater visibility within national 
political discourse than they might otherwise be able to. For instance, Zeinobia of 
Egyptian Chronicles asserts authority as a reliable, frequent source of current 
news, and other bloggers assert their prominence as thought leaders. While some 
posts contain mainly personal reflections, others urge readers to follow the 
blogger’s lead on a particular issue, such as the question of voting in or abstaining 
from elections. These blogs were an important way for individuals to engage 
meaningfully in the public dialogue about the nation’s future. 
At the same time, as bridgeblogs written largely or entirely in English, 
these blogs are, to varying degrees, intended for and accessible to a foreign 
audience. While Zeinobia seemed to establish her blog with the purpose of 
offering foreigners a perspective on Egyptian politics, Eskandar used his blog to 
cross-post interviews he had given to international media outlets. For foreign 
audiences, they provide individual, on-the-ground – but not definitive – 
perspectives on the political events unfolding in Egypt after the 2011 revolution. 
However, the analysis above makes clear that these bloggers are not merely 
writing to provide cross-cultural translation.  
Contrary to the categorization of bloggers writing in English as intended 
to reach a Western audience, these supposed “bridgebloggers” were very much 
invested in domestic politics and audiences. Their concerns with nationhood 
reveal that they are deeply committed to, rather than aloof from, ongoing national 
political struggles. Though their blogs do indeed in part fulfill the bridgeblog role 
of communicating with foreigners, their posts also address Egyptian audiences. 
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 Their discussions of nationhood, in particular, demonstrate the desire to 
communicate with fellow Egyptians who might share in the realization of that 
nationhood. It is crucial not to overlook this Egyptian audience when considering 
blogs written in English, insofar as it suggests that the blogs play an active role in 
Egypt’s domestic political sphere. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This ethnographic study of five Egyptian blogs has drawn out the bloggers’ 
unique contributions to discussion of a new nation in the wake of the 2011 
revolution.  It has revealed far more than mere explanations of the context and 
unfolding political events for a foreign audience in these bridgeblogs. Though I 
have focused on the discussions of nationhood present in each blog, other 
approaches might find these bloggers committed to domestic political dialogue in 
different ways.  
Close reading of these blogs has also revealed more diverse reasons why a 
blogger would choose to write in English. Some, such as Zeinobia and the Big 
Pharaoh, certainly do seem to fit the characterization of blogging in English in 
order to make Egyptian politics accessible to an international audience. However, 
contrary to this assumption, Sandmonkey stated that he chose to blog in English 
to avoid censorship and to reach the Egyptian elite. Other bloggers still write in 
both Arabic and English. 
These findings suggest the limited utility of the term “bridgeblog” to 
describe blogs written in English from bloggers within non-English-speaking 
countries, as that term circumscribes our understanding of the bloggers’ work. At 
the very least, blogs written in English may merit closer consideration to 
determine what other roles they may be playing, beyond that of a bridgeblog. The 
scope of this study is small, but it opens the door for further inquiry into what 
kind of political dialogue occurs in these online spaces. The findings call for 
deeper research into bridgeblogs to ascertain if these arguments hold true in a 
wider range of bridgeblogs.  
These five bloggers conveyed passionate ideas about Egypt’s nationhood 
and future. As Big Pharaoh expressed optimistically, “Just like any seed, [Tahrir] 
is destined to grow…Because if Tahrir came out of Tahrir, this country will 
change forever.” The trajectory of Egyptian politics since 2011 seems to suggest 
that the reality of Egyptian nationhood has diverged significantly from the 
bloggers’ early visions of nationhood after the revolution. Nonetheless, those 
early discussions about the nation provide fruitful grounds for research into the 
many complex political commitments English-language bloggers may have in 
their own country. 
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